Half of the reported serious adverse events from transfusion are a consequence of medical error. A no-fault medical-event reporting system for transfusion medicine (MERS-TM) was developed to capture and analyze both near-miss and actual transfusion-related errors.
well as actual events. The aviation industry has effectively used near-miss event-reporting systems to improve air safety through the redesign of aircraft equipment, air traffic control systems, airports, and pilot training. 6 Efforts to quantify the magnitude of the noninfectious risks of transfusions include the voluntary SHOT program 1 ; the New York State Department of Health mandatory reporting program of transfusion-related incidents, accidents, and errors 7 ; the French Haemovigilance System 8 ; and the Belgium SANGUIS Group. 9 Near-miss events have been estimated to be four times more frequent than actual events. 10 Others have attempted to improve the safety of transfusions within their institutions through specific interventions. [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] Approximately 15 percent of events are a consequence of multiple errors. 17 A no-fault medical-event reporting system for transfusion medicine (MERS-TM), designed by Battles et al., 18 was implemented at our center in an effort to quantify and study both errors and near-miss events. We describe here our experience at a single institution: the training and implementation process, the types and patterns of reported errors, the frequency of errors before and after corrective action, and a close look at the root causes of the most frequent errors.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The MERS-TM was implemented in February 1999 at Sunnybrook and Women's College Health Sciences Centre (Toronto, ON, Canada), a university-affiliated, AABB-accredited teaching hospital. The system was implemented as designed by Battles 18 and Kaplan 19 et al. It is a no-fault eventreporting system designed with input from the American Red Cross, Blood Systems Inc., America's Blood Centers, the AABB, and the FDA.
The MERS-TM has several functional components: detection, selection, description, classification, computation, and interpretation. Detection encompasses the place and time an event was discovered; the number of critical points breached before the event was discovered; the consequences of the event; the job description of the primary person involved; and the recovery action taken by the individuals involved. Selection entails a determination by the quality assurance systems leader or operator as to whether the error is a new event, which requires an expanded investigation, or a recurrent event, which requires a less detailed analysis. Description involves the recording of free text that details the event. The event is then classified by using preset event codes and 20 possible causal codes. Causal codes are subdivided into latent failures (organizational and technical), active failures (human-related errors), and patient-related factors (e.g., patient fails to communicate history of pregnancy before transfusion).
A technical error occurs when there are problems with equipment, software, materials, labels, or forms. Organizational errors occur when there are problems with protocols, procedures, transfer of knowledge, management priorities, and culture. Computation and interpretation include the analysis of the events to determine "peak" areas, or the most frequent events. Near-miss events, defined as events for which a recovery step (planned or unplanned) allows for interruption and correction of the error, are included. The MERS-TM form is shown in Fig. 1 .
At the commencement of the study, the MERS-TM project staff in the United States performed onsite training of eight members of our transfusion service over a 2-day period. The workshop included a 3-hour introduction to errors in medicine and root-cause analysis. The remainder of the time was spent learning to describe and classify events, with emphasis on 23 real events recorded in the preceding 4 weeks. An optical character-resolution software program (Teleform, Cardiff Software, Vista, CA) facilitated the transfer of event data from paper to the MERS-TM database. During the implementation, blood bank staff were oriented to the system, with specific emphasis on the no-fault nature of the program. At 6 and 12 months after the start of the project, the same selected events were analyzed in parallel to confirm consistency in coding and ranking by the MERS-TM project staff, all remaining issues were resolved, and implementation of MERS-TM was completed at our institution.
The MERS-TM was introduced to the laboratory blood bank staff by a 1-hour didactic lecture on the purpose of the error-reporting system. To maintain a high level of error detection, we communicated frequent updates to the technologists and notified them of the efforts we were exerting in the other areas of the hospital in attempts to curtail error frequency (e.g., education, changing forms). We also placed a MERS-TM bulletin board in the blood bank as a place for technologists to anonymously place error reports and as a place to post the "error of the week" and quarterly reports.
Events between February 1999 and August 2000 were analyzed. The following variables were included in the analysis: the point in the process that the event was detected (from before testing of patient's sample to after component infusion), the date of the event, the point in the process that the event occurred (from patient sample collection to unit transfusion), the job description of the person involved, the result of the event, the level of severity or potential for severity, the type of investigation (routine or expanded), the event description, and causal codes. Severity or potential severity of events was classified into three levels: Level 1 events have the potential for permanent injury or to be life-threatening; Level 2 events have the potential for minimal or transient harm; and Level 3 events have no realistic potential for harm. During the 19-month period, we also implemented a number of interventions to address frequent events and events with the potential for Level 1 severity. The individual root cause for which corrective action was developed was based on factors www.transfusion.org such as anticipated effectiveness, ease of implementation, and cost. The MERS-TM was then used to monitor the effectiveness of the chosen corrective action. If the events continue to be identified, another root cause can be evaluated for possible implementation of corrective action.
RESULTS

Descriptive event data
Eight hundred nineteen events were recorded. Figure 2 depicts the number of events per month for the entire period, subdivided by the severity of the event. A median 51 events per month were detected (range, . No serious adverse patient outcome occurred, despite the transfusion of 17,465 units of RBCs. From July 1999 to December 1999, two chief members of the event-reporting team were on temporary leave of absence. During this time, a 50-percent drop in the number of reported events was noted (median, 27 events vs. 53 events during the other months). During the remainder of the study period, the staffing of the laboratory remained stable, with the exception that a senior technologist was placed on permanent night shift. Overall, 61 events (7.4%) were categorized as Level 1, 40 (4.9%) as Level 2, and 718 (87.7%) as Level 3. Level 1 errors are presented in detail in Table 1 . Eighty-two percent (672/819) of the total number of events were classified as near-miss events. Important consequences resulting from the 819 events were the discarding of blood or blood components (77 events with 170 units discarded); repeat sample collection (284 events); additional testing (28 events); computer data correction (213 events); and extra telephone calls to the wards (89 events).
The point in the process at which the event was detected, from receipt of blood to transfusion to the time of the next test, is shown in Fig. 3 ; 68 percent of events were detected before the release of blood. The distribution of events categorized by both the severity of the error and the job description of the person deemed most responsible for the error is shown in Table 2 (61% involved nurses, physicians, or ward clerical support; 35% involved the laboratory; and 4% involved other hospitals or Canadian Blood Services). During this period, our hospital performed blood group determinations and antibody screens on 27,067 hospital patient samples and on 63,612 private laboratory samples, as well as 29,076 crossmatches. During the same period, 17,016 units of allogeneic blood, 449 units of autologous blood, 17,278 units of other components, and 21,261 orders of manufactured blood derivatives were issued for transfusion. There were no cases of the transfusion of the wrong unit of packed RBCs or other components to a patient. Event rates are shown in Table 3 .
The distribution of event categories is shown in Fig. 4 . The four most common events were sample handling (e.g., failure to correctly record the patient's identification on the requisition or failure to sign the requisition), component request (e.g., ordering blood for the wrong patient or ordering the wrong blood component), component accessioning (e.g., component checked in with an incorrect expiration date), and sample collection (e.g., labeling blood samples with another patient's name, drawing blood from the wrong patient, or failing to label samples). The distribution of causal factors recorded as contributing to the events was human factors, 58 percent; organizational factors, 24 percent; technical factors, 15 percent; and patient-related factors, 3 percent. For the majority of events, multiple factors were considered to contribute to the event (median, 3 casual factors; range, 1-10).
Details of high-frequency events and monitoring after corrective action
Incorrect accessioning of blood into inventory. Our blood supplier, Canadian Blood Services, currently does not label the blood units with the expiration date, and thus this date must be calculated from the collection date. In addition, the unit number has only 6 digits, and therefore, over time, the unit numbers are reused. For the important reason of traceability, our blood bank information system (Mediware, Hemocare Information System, Melville, NY) will not allow for duplicate numbers, and therefore these units are assigned their own unique number on accessioning, which adds a step to the process and another opportunity for error. We detected a median of four events of this type per month (range, 0-13). One in 394 units of blood or components is incorrectly accessioned at our institution with the present system. Of these events, 88 percent were due to the entering of an incorrect expiration date, 11 percent were due to errors in assigning duplicate numbers, and 1 percent to the entering of the wrong blood group. These events result from system defects that are external to our institution, and they result in delays in the issuing of blood (due to time needed to correct events before unit issue), nonproductive workload, and loss of inventory (blood products discarded before expiration). This information was forwarded to Canadian Blood Services, and they have established both International Society of Blood Transfusion 128 (ISBT 128) implementation and expiration date labeling as priorities. ISBT 128 labeling requirements will be mandatory for AABB-accredited facilities by January 31, 2002, and this will allow us to read from the barcode the expiration date, the blood groups, and the unit numbers and thus will effectively eliminate this type of error.
Sample-collection events. During the period from February 1999 to March 2000, we detected a median frequency of four sample collection errors per month (range, 0-7). Sample collection errors included labeling the sample with the wrong patient identification, phlebotomizing the wrong patient, or submitting unlabeled samples for testing. Rootcause analysis implicated the following factors: failure to label samples at the bedside because the labels and patient identification cards, prepared on admission and used to make the printed labels, were located at a distance from the patient (technical error); the information system's lack of capability to perform bedside labeling (technical error); and inadequate nursing education on the procedure for collecting samples (organizational error). We therefore performed 24 educational sessions on "Preventing ABO-incompatible transfusions" between April and May 2000. These smallgroup, case-based, 45-to 60-minute educational sessions stressed the importance of labeling samples at the bedside with the correct patient identification and of ordering blood for the correct patient. Errors from the preceding year were used for these cases, and nurses were encouraged to identify the potential points of error within the system. The following areas of high blood use were involved: Cardiovascular Intensive Care Unit, Critical Care Unit, Haematology/Oncology inpatient and outpatient areas, and Emergency Services. Despite these educational sessions, the rate of events in the period after May 2000 was unchanged (median, 4 events/month; range, 2-8).
The inadequate effect of education led to a trial of a positive patient identification system in an attempt to mandate labeling at the bedside, thus correcting another system defect identified in the MERS-TM analysis. We utilized a bedside labeling system (I-TRAC Plus System, Immucor, Norcross, GA) in our Emergency Department. This system uses wristband barcodes, portable handheld data terminals, and printers to allow for easy bedside labeling. Before this trial, we had 35 (3%) events in 1175 emergency room requests for testing or for a blood component. Five of the 35 events were of Level 1 severity. During implementation, it was clear that, despite our educational efforts, only rarely did nurses label a specimen at the bedside, because of the inconvenience of generating labels before going to the bedside. During the trial of this system, we processed 67 blood group determinations and antibody screens with five documented events (7%), all of which were Level 3 and correctable with minor changes to the I-TRAC Plus System, including interfacing to our hospital information system. Sample-handling events. During the first 17 months, we received a median of eight unsigned requisitions per month (range, 2-16). The AABB standards mandate that each sample drawn for blood bank testing is labeled at the bedside and that there is a mechanism to identify the phlebotomist. 20 In our transfusion service, this mechanism is the phlebotomist's signature on the requisition. Failure to comply with this protocol results in the need for repeat phlebotomy and delays the issue of blood. Root-cause analysis implicated the following factors: a poor design of the blood bank form (technical error) and lack of a mechanism for our information system to capture an electronic signature (technical error). We implemented a new requisition form on July 1, 2000, on which the area to sign is delineated by a thick black box, and written above the box in 18-point block capitals is over the subsequent 2 months. The alteration to the form did not provide sufficient reinforcement of the need to sign, and therefore we are evaluating an electronic signature as a "forcing function" to eliminate this type of error. Although such errors appear trivial, in several cases, the phlebotomist failed to sign the requisition for a patient in the trauma resuscitation room, and this resulted in the patient's receiving uncrossmatched blood until an adequate sample was received in the laboratory. Component-request events. From February 1999 to March 2000, we detected a median frequency of three component-request errors per month (range, 0-5). Componentrequest errors included orders for blood for the incorrect patient, the sending of transport personnel to pick up blood for the wrong patient, and orders for the wrong type of blood component. Root-cause analysis implicated the following factors: stamping of blood request forms with patient identification cards at a distance from the patient (technical error); lack of physician order entry for blood components (organizational error); and lack of nursing education on the proper procedure to follow when ordering blood components (organizational error). Between April and May 2000, our transfusion service performed 24 educational sessions on "Preventing ABO-incompatible transfusion," as detailed above. The new blood-ordering requisition forms implemented on July 1, 2000, were altered to clearly state the common indications for each blood component to minimize the error of ordering the wrong type of blood component. From June to August 2000, there was no reduction in the event frequency (median, 3 events; range, 3-5).
DISCUSSION
The SHOT initiative report of the first 2 years of operation should motivate transfusion services to make efforts to design better hospital transfusion systems to reduce the most commonly reported event, incorrect blood or component transfused (191/366 events reported). 1 We report here our experience with the MERS-TM. Our data confirm the system's power to detect the most frequent and severe events within our institution. The MERS-TM also allowed us to monitor the frequency of near-miss events after changes to the system, so as to determine the effectiveness of corrective action. It is clear from our experience that it is an extremely powerful tool, as has been shown for the formal event-reporting systems developed for the aviation, 6 nuclear power, 21 and petrochemical 22 industries. Transfusion-related incidents at our institution-and, we anticipate, at most other institutions-are unacceptably frequent. No event type was isolated to one department or individual. In none of the 819 events could we detect any malice on the part of the staff person involved. All events are repetitive and related to system or organizational problems, not exclusively human errors. We believe that our institution's error rate is at least equivalent with that of other institutions, with the most recent report from New York State 17 confirming that approximately 1 in 14,000 to 1 in 19,000 units of RBCs are transfused to the wrong patient (this report, 0/17,278).
The key areas of system dysfunction at our hospital included the incorrect collection of samples and the incorrect ordering of blood components. Linden and colleagues 17 found similar problems in a recent report from New York State, with the two most frequent errors being the administration of properly labeled blood to a recipient other than the intended one (38%) and phlebotomy errors (13%). At our institution, the vast majority of errors in which blood was almost given to a recipient other than the intended one were due to a nurse's or physician's request for blood for the wrong patient. Innovative techniques to reduce phlebotomy errors have included the use of an automated patient and sample identification system (Blood-Loc, Novatek Medical, Greenwich, CT), 11 adherence to the British Committee for Standards in Haematology guideline that recommends not using pre-printed patient identification card labels, 15 and the use of barcode-wanding systems. 16 Such systems should be investigated to determine the most effective method of reducing errors at all steps in the process, not only to improve safety, but also to streamline the system to minimize repeated sample collection, delays in release of blood components, wastage of blood components, and nonproductive workload. Unless we address phlebotomy and blood-ordering errors, they will continue with a predictable frequency. At our institution, we experience approximately one to two serious phlebotomy errors and three blood-request errors per month. Without system changes, these latent conditions will result in future near-miss events, one of which will eventually slip through our present barriers and cause patient harm.
Our experience confirms the ineffectiveness of didactic small-group educational sessions, as found in a recent metaanalysis of randomized trials of continuing medical education. 23 We believe that education of the medical and nursing personnel is necessary but, in itself, insufficient to reduce the frequency and severity of events. Recently, however, we have experienced several cases in which nurses at our institution have observed transfusion-related errors and notified us immediately, which suggests that education may have a role in increasing the detection of errors. Our emergency department and blood bank personnel requested that we post our MERS-TM reports on their notification boards to alert them to areas with the potential for error. We believe that such requests are the start of an enhanced "safety culture" at our institution.
Although personnel working directly with patients and patients' samples have been receptive to the MERS-TM program, highly motivated supervisory and management personnel are critical to its implementation and ongoing sup-
